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CARNEY v NEWTON: EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE STANDARD OF
CLINICAL NOTES
In Carney v Newton [2006] TASSC 4 the Tasmanian Supreme Court heard a
claim that the defendant breached his duty of care by failing to properly
diagnose and treat a node positive carcinoma in the plaintiff’s breast tissue.
At trial, argument turned on the actual dialogue that took place during the
initial consultation, with significant reliance on the clinical notes of the
defendant. The court gave considerable weight to “expert” witnesses in
ascertaining the acceptability of the defendant’s conduct concerning the
maintenance and interpretation of his clinical notes. This raises important
questions in relation to proof of quality of medical records as part of the
current professional standard of care, as modified by recent legislation in
most jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION
Access to and interpretation of clinical records about the discourse between medical practitioners and
patients have always been critical to both the protection of the doctor from medical negligence actions
and, in evidentiary form, to the patient’s standing to sue should he or she be wronged. This was
demonstrated recently in Carney v Newton [2006] TASSC 4. The basis of this Tasmanian Supreme
Court action was a claim that the defendant breached his duty of care by failing to properly diagnose
and treat a node positive carcinoma in the plaintiff’s breast tissue. At trial, a focus of argument
concerned evidence about the examination and actual dialogue that took place during the initial
consultation. Of particular concern was the extent to which this should have been, and was, accurately
recorded in the clinical notes of the defendant. Much weight was given by the court to the testimony
of expert witnesses in ascertaining the acceptability of the defendant’s conduct and the interpretation
of the clinical notes. This raises important questions as to the viability in Australia of this form of
evidence about this aspect of the current professional practice standard of care.1 It also highlights one
particular implication of the recent alterations to this standard by legislation in most Australian
jurisdictions. It is suggested that the ongoing lack of uniform guidelines and standards-based
regulation of the nature and quality of clinical records remains a cause for concern within the
Australian medical profession and for those patients who come into contact with it.
THE FACTS: CARNEY V NEWTON
The plaintiff attended a consultation with her general practitioner, the defendant, in January 2002. At
trial, the plaintiff alleged that during this consultation the defendant conducted a breast examination
and detected an abnormality. The defendant allegedly said, “We’ll keep an eye on that”, and suggested
that she continue with regular self-examination and return if there were any significant changes.
Nine months passed before the plaintiff, a doctor herself, returned due to swelling and tenderness
in the breast. She was now pregnant. At this second consultation, the plaintiff suggested that her
condition might be that of mastitis. The general practitioner defendant agreed and referred her for a
diagnostic ultrasound for confirmation.
Following the ultrasound, which confirmed mastitis, the plaintiff made an appointment with Mr
Wilkinson, a general surgeon. A biopsy was conducted by Mr Wilkinson, which returned positive
results for high-grade adenocarcinoma.
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The plaintiff then consulted Dr Kimber, an oncologist, whose notes reported that the plaintiff had
said that she had only noticed some irregularity in her right breast since May 2002, that is, after she
became pregnant. This was a point of contention at trial due to the claim by the plaintiff that her initial
consultation with the general practitioner defendant, in January 2002, was the first time she was told
an irregularity had been detected. In evidence the defendant expressed that it was his practice to report
in his notes any abnormalities in a patient’s breasts. Examination of his notes here showed no evidence
of such a finding. His records for this consultation included the note, “breasts 44”, which the general
practitioner defendant interpreted to the court as indicating that an examination had occurred and both
breasts were normal.
One expert witness suggested that the defendant’s notes were highly inadequate. However, the
court accepted the opinions of other practitioners who attested that the conduct of the defendant, based
on his notes, was of an acceptable standard. Crawford J held that, on the basis of expert evidence
about the clinical notes, it was more probable that no abnormality was detected during the initial
consultation, that this was communicated to the patient and the defendant consequently did not fail to
meet an acceptable standard of care.
The case thus illustrates the old problem of concerns likely to be experienced by medical
practitioners in ensuring their conduct and communications with a patient are accurately demonstrable
in court should a medical negligence action be pursued by the patient. It also, however, highlights an
often underestimated feature of expert evidence in ascertaining an acceptable professional standard of
care: the standard of the clinical notes and the conflicts they may reveal. This column explores these
features in the context of a prospective system of improved regulation of Australian clinical records.
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND CLINICAL NOTES
Read as a whole and in its contemporary formulations, the Hippocratic Oath still retains a profound
symbolic relevance to encouraging an ethical approach to the practice of medicine and shaping the
professional standard of care in areas such as maintenance of medical records.2 It is often forgotten
that such an “ethical approach” starts and ends with virtues such as respect for patient dignity
(recently including autonomy) and loyalty to the relief of individual patient suffering, which may be
regarded as a central, coordinating professional virtue.3 Keeping this in mind, an “ethical approach” to
medical practice should be taught professionally and regarded judicially as involving the consistent
application of the principles found in such documents in the face of obstacles. The formulation and
limits of these principles are not rigidly determined, as has been demonstrated time and again when
they have been tested in judicial proceedings about the standard of care in a variety of jurisdictions
around the world. The passage of the Oath concerning confidentiality is merely one example of this:
All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession … which ought not to be spread
abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal.
Nowadays, exceptions to this ethical principle routinely are justified under a variety of public health
statutes and when required of the medical practitioner in a court. Indeed, as King CJ noted in F v R
(1983) 33 SASR 189 at 194, the inclination of practitioners in some circumstances to act in a manner
that primarily protects their professional self-interest routinely cuts across the consistent application of
traditional ethical principles that support patient interests.
Routinely keeping good clinical records should be regarded as a means by which a doctor can
effectively signal to other practitioners (including those in relevant medical boards), patients and the
legal profession, the extent to which he or she is consistently applying ethical principles in the face of
obstacles. Certainly, such textual self-promotion, if engaged upon cynically, could be regarded more as
a core medical vice than a virtue. Yet each day we move closer to closed-circuit recording of every
consultation and many patients now have the technological capacity to readily record their interaction
2 North M, Hippocratic Oath (2002), US National Library of Medicine, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html
viewed 2 May 2007.
3 Faunce TA, “Will International Human Rights Subsume Medical Ethics? Intersections in the UNESCO Universal Bioethics
Declaration” (2005) 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 173 at 173.
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with doctors. Shared electronic access to a single national database of medical records detailing all
health system encounters over a patient’s lifetime is likely also to soon be a reality.4 This creates grave
problems for civil liberties and patient protection, given the steady erosion over the last decade of an
independent public service, freedom of information laws and the continued absence of constitutional
protections of fundamental rights such as privacy. A considerable and crucial discrepancy between the
clinical notes and such audio-visual recordings will undoubtedly soon become a core point of
contention in a medico-legal action. Regardless of what it may indicate about the sincerity of a
doctor’s commitment to applying ethical principles in the face of obstacles, it creates a huge liability
risk. Such a risk by an individual practitioner may soon become unacceptable to those managed-care,
private medical insurance and medical defence organisation executives who increasingly dominate the
regulatory architecture of doctor-patient relations.
CLINICAL NOTES: PREFERENTIAL EVIDENCE?
The basis for an action in medical negligence fundamentally proceeds from a claim that a practitioner
failed to exercise a reasonable standard of care and skill in providing medical advice and treatment.5
In the course of judgment, the court will invariably rely on evidence presented by the doctor, and this
will frequently be based substantially on medical records.
In Carney v Newton, notes by the defendant, including two ticks next to the word “breasts”, were
criticised by one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses for being too vague (at [37]). Crawford J rejected
this and accepted the interpretation offered by the defendant as to the meaning: that this identified both
breasts as normal, that is, objectively free of diseased tissue.
The defendant’s notes in Carney v Newton were given weight by the judge over the allegations by
the plaintiff that the doctor failed at the initial consultation to palpate her breasts in response to the
swelling that she claimed that doctor said they were to “keep an eye on”.
Crawford J was faced with a lack of relevant detail in the clinical notes, an inability on the part of
the defendant to recall the event and differing expert opinions as to whether the quality of clinical
notes met the professional standard of care. He noted in his concluding remarks (at [52]) that the point
turned on the inconsistent nature of the plaintiff’s evidence. How illustrative this is of some of the
warnings routinely given to medical students:
Often medico-legal proceedings will take place so many years after the actual events you will have no
independent record apart from your notes. If you mostly keep accurate notes you are more likely to be
able to mount a case about your routine practice. Record key aspects of conversations as direct quotes.
Supplement discussions with individualised clinical information sheets. Similarly, where the
professional practice standard relates to protecting public safety,6 evidence from many clinical notes can
be used to show your routine practice does not infringe that standard.
In Australia, post Ipp Committee legislative tort reforms have led to variations in approaches to
determining the standard of care. In general, the analysis of a doctor’s notes and subsequent conduct
may be judged by expert witnesses in order to decide whether the doctor acted in accordance with
practice considered proper by a body of medical practitioners (peer professional opinion), that opinion
not being deemed irrational or unreasonable by the court.7 Fundamentally, it remains for the court to
decide what is an appropriate standard.8 Legislative provisions such as those relevant to Carney v
Newton state that a breach of the standard of care may be established by looking to whether the
conduct of the defendant accords with a modified form of what is known as the “Bolam test”,
emphasising the importance of opinion of even a minority of reasonable competent practitioners as to
4 Iacovino L, Mendelson D and Paterson M, “Privacy Issues, HealthConnect and Beyond” in Freckelton I and Petersen K (eds),
Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law (Federation Press, Sydney, 2006) p 604.
5 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 483.
6 For example, Health Professionals Act 2004 (ACT), s 18.
7 Bennett B and Freckelton I, “Life After the Ipp Reforms: Medical Negligence Law” in Freckelton and Petersen, n 4, p 381;
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 59.
8 F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189.
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what constitutes competent professional practice.9 Here, clinical notes were critical to finding that the
diagnosis made by the defendant and the treatment prescribed was acceptable and appropriate (at
[50]). Similarly, in the Australian Capital Territory, the relevant provision requires expert witnesses, in
deciding whether a particular case amounts to negligence, to have regard to the opinion of respected
practitioners in Australia in the relevant field.10
A 1998 New South Wales Regulatory Impact Statement recognised that poor record-keeping is
evidence of sub-standard medical practice, though not negligence.11 If a decision as to whether a
doctor has acted negligently rests largely with the opinion of fellow practitioners, there is a strong case
for greater uniformity across the board in record-keeping to ensure all relevant facts are recorded and
are of legible quality.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS GREATER CLARITY AND CONSISTENCY IN
RECORD-KEEPING
Such controversies concerning the facts of a given case, and the judicial tendency to preferentially
interpret the notes of the practitioner, provide support for greater regulation concerning the nature and
quality of clinical records. Currently, under New South Wales legislation, there exists a provision for
the creation of regulations concerning medical records.12 Subsequent regulations were implemented in
1998.13 Of particular interest is Regulation 2, which states that the detail of a record must correlate to
the patient’s circumstances, without explanation of what this means in a practical sense.14 Another
regulation states that shorthand may only be used if it is a generally acceptable abbreviation
understood as such by the medical profession or the wider medical community.15 The question raised
is whether this approach should be broadened and standardised throughout Australia.
Regardless of such regulatory efforts, when medico-legal claims reach court the notes made by
the practitioner seem a perpetual source of uncertainty. Cripps AJ, for instance, has spoken of the
clinical notes made by a defendant as being “almost indecipherable” and that there were “significant
omissions” given the circumstances.16 On the other hand, in cases such as McClelland v Zacharias
(2004) BCSC 1077 the importance of thorough clinical notes in the protection of the doctor is clearly
demonstrated. Despite the plaintiff’s claims that the defendant failed to act on the presenting
symptoms, it was held that, based on the clinical records of the defendant, relevant symptoms were, in
fact, not disclosed by the plaintiff (at [50]). The trial was later described by the defendant’s solicitor as
a credibility contest where the defendant was successful primarily due to his thorough records.17
It should now be more widely recognised that a national system of electronic medical records will
fail unless a national standard for the quality of medical records is devised and implemented.
Maintaining comprehensive medical records is crucial to any medico-legal defence and that any costs
associated with maintaining such good standards in practice are readily offset by the benefits that
ensue should a doctor be sued.
Indeed, Australia may benefit from replicating schemes initiated in Britain where incentives for
reaching certain standards in areas of hospital care have been implemented. Reducing insurance
9 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 22; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 22; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 41; Wrongs Act 1958
(Vic), s 59; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50.
10 Civil Liability (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 87(4).
11 New South Wales Health, Medical Records Regulation NSW 2003 Regulatory Impact Statement (2003) at [7.1].
12 Medical Practices Act 1992 (NSW), s 126(1)(: “The regulations may make provision for or with respect to requiring
registered medical practitioners and corporations engaged in the provision of medical services to make and keep specified
records.”
13 Medical Practice Regulations 2003 (NSW), reg 2
14 Medical Practice Regulations 2003 (NSW) .
15 Medical Practice Regulations 2003 (NSW), reg 3.
16 PD v Harvey [2003] NSWSC 487 at [7], [8].
17 Rogers B, “Detailed Notes Save BC Doctor in Credibility Contest” (2004) 40(39) Medical Post 32 at 33.
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premiums upon reaching a specified standard in areas such as patient records has proven to be a
successful mechanism for improving the quality of clinical notes.18 In addition, one study conducted
into the quality of medical records before and after a pro forma was introduced, showed that the pro
forma improved patient management as well as comprehensive documentation in the event of
litigation.19 Voice-to-text transcription of notes is a further option that provides for expeditious and
clear documentation. This system involves a doctor dictating the notes into a recording device that is
then uploaded and sent to a central agency which redirects them to a transcriptionist for processing.20
Regardless of the preferred method, Carney v Newton highlights the need for greater action in
improving professional standards in this area.
Thomas Faunce
Director, Globalisation and Health Project, College of Law, Australian National University
Ingrid Hammer BA LLB
Research Assistant, Globalisation and Health Project, Australian National University
Susannah Jefferys BA LLB (Hons)
Acting Chair, Professionalism and Leadership Theme (yrs 1-2), Australian National University
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
HEALTH AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT ACT 2007 (QLD)
On 24 May 2007, the Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) (the Act) was passed
in the Queensland Parliament. The Act amends the Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld) and the Health
Services Act 1991 (Qld) to create a regulatory framework for the conduct of “root cause analysis”
(RCA). Section 38H of the Act defines RCA as an analysis of a reportable (adverse) event which:
(1) means a systematic process of analysis under which –
(a) factors that contributed to the happening of the event may be identified; and
(b) remedial measures that could be implemented to prevent a recurrence of a similar event may
be identified.
(2) However, a root cause analysis or RCA of a reportable event does not include –
(a) investigating the professional competence of a person in relation to the event; or
(b) finding out who is to blame for the happening of the event.
RCA is a quality improvement technique that explores the chain of events responsible for adverse
incidents in order to identify the factors which caused or contributed to the incident. RCA also
considers what measures may be implemented in order to stop such adverse incidents from happening
again. It is widely acknowledged within health and other industry sectors that adverse events rarely
have a single cause, and that they most commonly result from a combination of individual, team,
organisational and environmental factors. As a result, the primary focus of the RCA should be on
identifying and improving the policies, procedures or practices relating to the provision of the health
service that contributed to the happening of the event, rather than on the conduct of individuals (s 38J
of the Act). The goal of the RCA technique is to encourage reporting and acknowledgment of adverse
incidents. To facilitate this goal and to encourage participation in RCA by health professionals,
involvement in the process is voluntary and the Act provides statutory privilege to information and
documents produced for RCA purposes (thus removing fear of blame and reprisal). RCA is to be used
by health service facilities parallel to, and not as a substitute for, consumer complaints systems,
professional standards regulation and/or legal processes (civil and criminal).
18 Office of Safety and Quality in Health Care, Introduction to Clinical Governance – A Background Paper Information Series
No 1.1, www.health.wa.gov.au/safteyandquality/ viewed 11 April 2007.
19 Schmidt M et al, “An Audit of Completeness of Clinical Histories: Before and After Introduction of a Pro Forma” (2005)
16(12) International Journal of STD and AIDS 822 at 824.
20 Taft DK, “Tech Duo Prescribes Solution for Doctors; DTS, Ajilon Team Up on Net-based System that Automates
Voice-to-Text Transcription” (2005) 22(3) eWeek 4 at 5.
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MENTAL HEALTH ACT 2007 (NSW)
The Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) (NSW) was passed by the New South Wales State Parliament and
assented to on 15 July 2007. The objects of this Act are to make provision with respect to the care,
treatment and control of mentally ill persons and mentally disordered persons and other matters
relating to mental health.
Chapter 2 (proposed ss 5-11) sets out the circumstances in which a person may be admitted to a
mental health facility as a voluntary patient under the proposed Act. It also sets out the additional
requirements relating to the voluntary admission of children and persons under guardianship. An
“authorised medical officer” (that is, a medical superintendent of a mental health facility or a medical
officer nominated by the medical superintendent) may refuse to admit a person as a voluntary patient
and may discharge a person as a voluntary patient. A right of appeal is provided to the medical
superintendent against any such decision by a medical officer nominated by the medical
superintendent. The case of a voluntary patient must be reviewed at least once a year, if the patient
remains in a mental health facility.
Chapter 3, Pt 1 (proposed ss 12-16) provides that a person must not be involuntarily admitted to,
or detained in or continue to be detained in, a mental health facility unless an authorised medical
officer is of the opinion that the person is a mentally ill person or a mentally disordered person and
that no other care of a less restrictive kind is appropriate and reasonably available to the person. An
authorised medical officer has a duty to discharge a person if not of that opinion. This Part sets out the
criteria which a person who is suffering from mental illness or who is mentally disordered must satisfy
before being considered to be a mentally ill person or mentally disordered person for the purpose of
involuntary detention under the proposed Act or being made subject to a community treatment order
under the proposed Act.
Chapter 4, Div 1 (proposed ss 68-72) sets out general principles for the care and treatment of
people with a mental illness or mental disorder, including the principle that people with a mental
illness or a mental disorder should receive the best possible care and treatment in the least restrictive
environment enabling the care and treatment to be effectively given. The Division makes it an offence
for an authorised medical officer or an employee at a mental health facility wilfully to strike, wound,
ill-treat or neglect a patient or detained person. It also requires interpreters to be provided for medical
examinations if a person cannot communicate adequately in English. The Division also provides for
primary carers under the Act, including the process for nominating primary carers.
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